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UNCITRAL and the enforceability of 
iMSAs: the debate heats up – Part 2 
Dorcas Quek Anderson, Nadja Alexander (Editor) and Anna Howard (AssociateEdito
r) 
  
The 65th session of the UNCITRAL Working Group II on arbitration and conci
liation in Viennahas commenced. Many mediators have been keenly monitorin
g the Working Group’sdeliberations and discussions concerning the enforcem
ent of international commercial settlementagreements resulting from conciliati
ons (iMSAs). 
An unresolved but crucial question is the exact form that the final instrumen
t should take. Oneoption is a multilateral convention, analogous to the New Yo
rk Convention on the Recognitionand Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
for arbitral awards (New York Convention). Disputeresolution practitioners are 
rather divided on this move. The tendency, as in all conflicts, hasbeen to be p
ositional on either view on this matter. 
Yet, all mediators will be aware of the need to dig deeper to understand the co
ncerns underlyingthe debate. In this four-
part series of posts – jointly written with Nadja Alexander and AnnaHoward – 
we seek to crystallise the key concerns about the move towards a multilateralc
onvention. We have grouped the concerns under four clusters: 
1. the legitimacy of such a convention; 
2. the impact of such a convention on the objectives of, and values underpinni
ng, the mediationprocess; 
3. the justifications for a convention; and 
4. the application of an arbitration enforcement framework to iMSAs, particular
ly in light of recenttrends in arbitration. 
In this second post, we now focus on the impact of a convention on the objecti
ves of mediation, asubject which will undoubtedly be close to many mediators’
 hearts. 
A convention which is meant to support the use of mediation ought to be consi
stent with thenature, underlying values and objectives of the mediation proces
s. But challenges inevitably arisebecause of the confidential, consensual, flexi
ble and informal nature of mediation, as well as itsstrong philosophical underpi
nnings of party autonomy and mediator neutrality. Can such a uniqueprocess 
ever be subject to strict rules of enforcement without losing its essential qualiti
es? This isprobably the most fundamental question that the Working Group an
d other dispute resolutionpractitioners have to address in order to arrive at a s
atisfactory outcome. Let us unpack the issuefurther. 
(A) Concerns about mediation confidentiality 
Confidentiality can be said to be a hallmark of the mediation process, one whi
ch distinguishes itfrom adjudicatory dispute resolution processes. Mediation c
onfidentiality provides a safe spacefor disputants to candidly share their thoug
hts, with the assurance that all their discussions will beshielded from public scr
utiny. Confidentiality is one of the key characteristics of mediation thatmakes it
 an attractive dispute resolution process. 
A convention to enforce iMSAs is likely to introduce enforcement mechanisms,
 together withgrounds to challenge enforcement. Once these grounds are rais
ed, the mediation process willinevitably be scrutinised by the courts, resulting i
n an erosion of confidentiality. 
The Working Group in its latest note for the current meeting acknowledged 
that disclosureduring the enforcement process may be at odds with the confid
ential nature of the mediationprocess. For instance, one of the defences to enf
orcement in the proposed draft provision8(e) states: “The conciliator failed t
o maintain fair treatment of the parties, or did not disclosecircumstances likely 
to give rise to justifiable doubts as to its impartiality or independence.” Anargu
ment premised on this defence will certainly entail the disclosure of communic
ations madeduring the mediation. 
Nevertheless, this tension between enforcement and mediation confidentiality 
is not new. Manycountries’ domestic jurisprudence have wrestled with these cl
ashing needs and sought to strike abalance. Mediation confidentiality has nev
er been upheld absolutely; various jurisdictions havecarefully calibrated excep
tions to mediation confidentiality. 
For example, the UK common law allows for admissibility of “without prejudice
” communicationsto determine whether a settlement was reached (for the purp
ose of enforcing the settlement), orto show that an apparent agreement shoul
d be set aside on the ground of misrepresentation,fraud or undue influence (U
nilever Plc v The Procter & Gamble Co.  [2000] 1 WLR 2536).“Without preju
dice” communications are generally understood to refer to discussions betwee
nparties aimed at negotiating a resolution to their conflict, and include commu
nications made in amediation setting. Section 4 of the USA Uniform Mediati
on Act  also contains a balancing testfor the court to decide if the need for the
 evidence in advancing a defence substantiallyoutweighs the interest in protec
ting mediation confidentiality. 
The challenge in balancing these opposing needs lies in ensuring that mediati
on confidentiality isnot undermined greatly in a wide range of situations. Drawi
ng from some of these approaches,the Working Group could perhaps frame th
e defences to enforcements narrowly and allowexceptions to mediation confid
entiality in very limited circumstances. 
(B) Concerns about self-
determination, mediator neutrality and “fairness” 
Party autonomy and mediator neutrality are two other tenets of the mediation 
process. The finaloutcome within a mediation hinges on the disputants’ joint d
ecision, and not the mediator’sdetermination of the underlying issues. The dis
putants decide on whether to settle, and how tosettle. Party autonomy or self-
determination is one of the significant philosophical underpinningsof the media
tion process. Mediator neutrality – a related concept – means that the mediato
rshould remain impartial throughout the mediation and not side with any one di
sputant. Becausethe mediator respects the parties’ autonomy, he or she refrai
ns from imposing personal views onthem, as long as they have freely consent
ed to the outcome. 
Because mediation is a consensual process, the concept of “fairness” has bee
n generallyunderstood to be vastly different from “fairness” in an adjudicative p
rocess. Some commentatorshave pointed out, in this regard, that procedural f
airness in mediation is associated with theparties’ perceptions on whether the
y were treated fairly by the mediator, rather than proceduralrules. Similarly, th
e substantive fairness of a mediated settlement is linked to the disputants’view
s on whether the mediation outcome met all their concerns, instead of being d
etermined byexisting law. 
We can see how difficulties will abound once we apply the adjudicative meani
ng of “fairness”within the New York Convention to mediation. Such an underst
anding of fairness is simplyincongruous with the mediation process. Art. V of t
he New York Convention  allows for areview of the arbitral award based on t
he lack of due process or procedural fairness. Likewise,Art V (1)(b) contains a
 due process defence of the party being unable to present his case. Issuch a d
efence applicable to mediation, which is not premised on the adversarial proce
ss ofpresenting arguments and obtaining a decision? This is yet another defen
ce in the New YorkConvention that sits awkwardly with the mediation process. 
It is evident that the New York Convention cannot be easily transposed to the 
mediation context(and we will elaborate more on this in our fourth and final po
st). At a fundamental level, we mayhave to question whether “fairness” and “d
ue process” are suitable concepts for the mediationprocess, or whether they h
ave to be replaced with more appropriate standards. And if theconcept of proc
edural fairness is to be used as a defence to enforcement of iMSAs, we have t
oarticulate what this concept entails in a mediation setting. Several commentat
ors, who haveprovided guidance on determining procedural fairness within me
diation, have been careful tosteer clear from notions associated with adjudicati
on. As an illustration, researchers have referredto standards such as the oppo
rtunity to express one’s views and even-
handedness in themediator’s dealing with the parties. 
(C) Concerns about creativity and flexibility within the mediation process 
Mediation, being an informal and interest-
based approach, can often bring about creative andfuture-
oriented solutions, such as an apology or the fulfilment of a future condition. It 
has beennoted that such solutions may not necessarily be “legally” enforceabl
e as court orders or arbitralawards. How can a multilateral instrument accomm
odate the creative outcomes of mediation? 
If enforcement is only allowed in very limited circumstances, disputants may cr
aft their iMSAsnarrowly to suit these restrictions. Some commentators have w
arned that iMSAs will then bedeprived of the depth and creativity that could ha
ve been possible absent the convention. Theconvention may end up stifling, in
stead of accommodating, the creativity that is inherent in themediation proces
s. 
The flexible nature of mediation is also at risk of being undermined. Many com
mon lawjurisdictions have been reluctant to regulate aspects of mediation, pro
bably because of the beliefthat mediation as a flexible and informal process is 
not amenable to excessive regulation. Indeed,as observed by Nadja Alexande
r in International and Comparative Mediation (Kluwer LawInternational, 2009)  
“an enforceability regime could reproduce the very legalities which partieshave
 eschewed in the mediation.” Too many rules about what kind of mediation is 
enforceableand defences to enforcement may well frustrate the malleable nat
ure of mediation. 
It appears that these issues have not been fully resolved at the Working Grou
p level. In an earlier2015 meeting, these concerns were alluded to in the follo
wing two passages: 
(i) “It was said that the type of obligations stipulated in a settlement agreement
 might be broad.Elements of complexities pertaining to settlement agreements
 were mentioned, such asreciprocal obligations, or conditions for the impleme
ntation of obligations that would renderenforcement more complex. It was also
 stated that settlement agreements usually containeddispute settlement clause
s to resolve disputes arising from the agreement.” (para 34) 
(ii) “It was mentioned that the introduction of an enforcement mechanism for s
ettlementagreements could blur the distinction that currently existed between 
arbitration and conciliation byadding more formal requirements to conciliation.”
 (para 30) 
The existing legal challenges in enforcing unusual iMSAs may well be an issu
e that cannot beresolved at this juncture. Even the current domestic laws are 
unable to accommodateenforcement of unusual MSA terms such as an apolo
gy. Disputants have already been craftingtheir settlement agreements to suit t
he present legal challenges relating to enforcement. Memberstates are unlikel
y to agree to create new enforcement methods that their own domestic laws d
onot provide for. 
Nonetheless, the difficulty may not necessarily be as insurmountable as it see
ms. Mediatorswould be familiar with research showing high compliance rates f
or iMSAs, probably because ofthe parties voluntarily crafting and agreeing to t
he terms of settlement. In my personal experienceas a mediator, the disputant
s arrived at creative and novel settlements usually when there is ahigh degree
 of trust and confidence in each other’s commitment to compliance. In suchcirc
umstances, breaches of the unconventional terms of settlement seldom arises
 after themediation. Is this the same situation for international iMSAs, and can 
it be concluded that there isno pressing need to create specific enforcement m
echanisms for creative iMSAs? This is wheremore detailed empirical research 
may inform and assist the Working Group. 
We have highlighted but a few potential effects of a multilateral convention on 
the mediationprocess, in the hope of conveying the importance of maintaining 
the essence of the mediationprocess. Difficult but significant questions have to
 be explored concerning the nature ofmediation, the current enforcement proc
esses and how enforcement can be tailored to fit theexact contours of the med
iation process. The UNCITRAL Working Group has no easy task offacilitating t
hese discussions and mediating between the opposing perspectives. But we tr
ust thatsuch conversations on the deep-
seated concerns underlying the debate will eventually bear fruitand result in w
orkable solutions for all. 
 
